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Abstract
The current paper reviewed two widely used approaches to assessing construct
stability over two time points (rank-order and mean-level consistency), as well as
common misconceptions about what each indicates. In addition, the application of
longitudinal mean and covariance structures (LMACS) analysis as a modern approach to
assessing construct stability was explained and demonstrated by assessing the stability of
psychological entitlement over 1.5 years measured via the Psychological Entitlement
Scale (PES).
Confirmatory factor analysis supported a one-factor solution for the PES at both
time points, and reliability of scores was adequate (ω = .88 and .89). Full configural and
metric invariance and partial scalar invariance were established for the PES. Rank-order
consistency of factor scores was moderate (r = .61) and the latent mean difference in
psychological entitlement across time was not statistically significant.
Results provided construct validity evidence for the PES regarding measurement
invariance and also indicated that psychological entitlement tended to be stable on
average but not at the individual level over 1.5 years. Discussion of the effects of
differential item functioning (DIF) of scalar non-invariant items on mean difference
testing and use of the PES with observed scores, the change in psychological entitlement
at the individual level, and the advantages of LMACS analysis as a unified approach to
assessing construct stability is also provided.
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Chapter I
Introduction
Assessing the Stability of a Construct over Two Time Points
Definition of longitudinal stability. A fair amount of psychological research has
focused on studying psychological constructs over time. Developmental psychologists,
for example, often measure constructs multiple times throughout a person‟s life, from
early childhood, through adolescence, to adulthood. One of the reasons researchers are
interested in studying constructs over time is to assess how constructs of interest change
and evolve (Chan, 1998). That is, researchers are often interested in whether scores
representing a construct remain stable over time (McCrae, Terracciano, & Khoury, 2007).
Longitudinal or temporal stability of a construct is essentially the lack of change in the
construct over time.
How is longitudinal stability typically evaluated? The evaluation of
longitudinal stability usually involves a repeated measures design, whereby data
representing the construct of interest are collected from the same sample of participants at
least twice, allowing a certain amount of time to lapse in between the data collection
occasions (Chan, 1998). The amount of time between data collection occasions varies
and is determined by the researchers based on the construct under study. With a paired
set of scores from just two time points, researchers often evaluate longitudinal stability in
one of two ways.
One method used to assess longitudinal stability is to compute the Pearson
product moment correlation coefficient between scores from Time 1 and Time 2. The
correlation coefficient representing the relationship between scores collected at two time
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points is often called test-retest consistency and indicates the stability of the rank order of
scores across time (i.e., rank-order consistency). That is, a high test-retest consistency
coefficient would indicate that respondents remained in the same position relative to
others from Time 1 to Time 2, whereas a low test-retest consistency coefficient would
indicate that respondents changed their relative position in the rank order of scores across
the two time points.
Another method of assessing stability is to compare the magnitude of the
observed score means at Time 1 and Time 2 via a dependent samples (repeated measures)
t-test. If the difference between means from the two data collection occasions is not
significantly different from zero, researchers often conclude that there was no (meanlevel) change in the construct from Time 1 to Time 2.
Typically, one of these two methods is used to evaluate stability. That is, either
rank-order consistency or mean-level change is used to make inferences as to whether a
construct is stable over two time points. Unfortunately, simply assessing rank orderconsistency or mean-level change to infer construct stability can be misleading, in that
the information necessary to make such an inference is incomplete (McCrae et al., 2007).
Below, I review the common misconceptions associated with the use of these methods to
assess stability.
Misconceptions about the assessment of construct stability. There are three
common misconceptions with respect to the evaluation of a construct‟s stability over two
time points. First, a high rank-order consistency coefficient is erroneously interpreted as
sufficient evidence for the argument that a construct is stable over time. A test-retest
consistency coefficient is simply an indicator of whether the rank order of respondents‟
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scores on the construct is consistent from one testing occasion to the next (i.e., those
scoring relatively high at Time 1 also score relatively high at Time 2, and those scoring
relatively low at Time 1 also score relatively low at Time 2). Consistency in the rank
order of scores does not imply that the mean level of the construct remains stable over
time. For example, it is possible that respondents‟ scores increased over time (i.e., level
of the construct increased), but did so by approximately the same amount (i.e., high rankorder consistency). Likewise, it is possible that respondents‟ scores decreased over time
(i.e., level of the construct decreased), but did so by approximately the same amount (i.e.,
high rank-order consistency).
A second misconception regarding the assessment of the stability of a construct
over time is that the lack of mean change from one testing occasion to the next implies no
individual change. This misconception is equivalent to erroneously stating that lack of
mean change across time also reflects high rank-order consistency. Recall that rankorder consistency indicates that respondents remained in relatively the same position
compared to others from one testing occasion to the next. Such consistency does not
indicate the absence or presence of average change in the construct across time. On the
other hand, mean-level change on the construct indicates change in respondents‟ scores
from Time 1 to Time 2 on average, but provides no information as to how individuals
changed across time.
To better illustrate the distinction between rank-order consistency and mean-level
consistency, consider the following four scenarios (see Figure 1) when crossing rankorder consistency results (yes vs. no) with mean consistency results (yes vs. no).
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1) There is rank-order consistency and mean consistency across time. Thus,
respondents preserved their relative position compared to others across time because all
respondents‟ scores on the construct remained the same across time.
2) There is rank-order consistency but not mean consistency. Respondents‟
relative position remained the same; those relatively high at Time 1 were relatively high
at Time 2. Moreover, on average, scores increased or decreased across time, which
would be reflected in a mean-level difference across time. However, the average change
does not imply that all respondents increased or decreased the same amount across time;
this would only be true if the consistency in rank order was 1.0. For example, if the
average change across time was 5 units, and the rank-order consistency was 1.0, this
would indicate that every respondent increased by 5 units across time. As the
consistency coefficient decreases from 1, this indicates that individuals change more or
less than each other across time.
3) There is no rank-order consistency, but there is mean consistency. That is,
respondents changed their relative position in the rank order of scores, but because some
respondents increased and others decreased, there is no change on average.
4) There is no consistency in either the rank order or average across time. This
would be the case if individuals changed over time (e.g., some increased, whereas others
decreased; all increased; or all decreased) but by different amounts; thus, resulting in
change on average (i.e., no mean level consistency), in addition to individual change (i.e.,
no rank-order consistency). Recall that a mean difference indicates change in the
construct on average—it does not reflect the type of individual change that occurred as
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respondents scores were “reshuffled” at Time 2 (as indicated by the lack of rank-order
consistency).
Despite the clear distinction between rank-order consistency and mean-level
consistency, researchers often report either of these two very different indicators as
evidence for the stability of a construct over two time points. The four possible scenarios
highlight the importance of examining and correctly interpreting both rank-order
consistency and mean-level change when assessing stability (Chan, 2003).
Clearly, it is important to avoid misconceptions about rank-order and mean-level
change. However, the third misconception is more fundamental and potentially has a
more serious impact on the validity of inferences about construct stability. Many
researchers erroneously assume the measurement of a construct remains stable or
invariant over time (Chan, 1998; 2003). When tested, this assumption is not always
empirically supported. Moreover, in order to accurately interpret mean-level or rankorder change, one must rule out change in the measurement of the construct over time.
Below I review how these three types of stability (e.g., stability in measurement, stability
in the average level of a construct, and stability in rank order) have been conceptualized
in the measurement literature and how to assess each empirically when modeling scores
from two time points. It is important to note that empirically supporting any one type of
change (i.e., change in measurement, change in average level, or change in rank order) is
not necessarily better or worse than other types of change. Instead, these are merely
different types of change, all of which are worthy of interpretation (Chan, 2003).
Types of Stability and Contemporary Methods to Assess Them
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There are three indicators of the stability (or lack of change) of a construct over
two time points: 1) stability of factor structure (no gamma change) and stability of
measurement parameters (no beta change), 2) stability of average latent scores, which is
represented by no mean change in the construct across time (no alpha change), and 3)
stability of rank order, which is represented by a high correlation of factor scores across
time. Each of these indicators of longitudinal stability will be defined and the importance
of each when empirically evaluating stability across two time points will be explained.
Factor structure and measurement parameter stability. Factor structure
stability is the extent to which the factor structure underlying a measure‟s scores (i.e., the
number and form of the factors) does not change from one administration of the measure
to the next. Measurement parameter stability is the degree to which factor pattern
coefficients and intercepts remain the same or invariant from one administration of the
measure to the next. Both factor structure and measurement parameter invariance must
be satisfied before one can evaluate the other two indicators of longitudinal stability of a
construct: no latent mean change in the construct and high rank-order consistency.
A popular framework for organizing some of the indicators of longitudinal
stability is the conceptualization of gamma, beta, and alpha (ГBA) change
(Golembiewski, Billingsley, & Yeager, 1976), where gamma and beta change pertain to
factor structure and measurement parameter instability, and alpha change refers to latent
mean change in the construct of interest across time. A contemporary method of testing
longitudinal measurement invariance and latent mean differences involves a multi-step
process known as longitudinal mean and covariance structures (LMACS) analysis.
LMACS analysis is considered a structural equation modeling technique (Vandenberg &
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Lance, 2000). More specifically, LMACS analysis is considered an extension of
longitudinal factor analysis (Chan, 2003). This LMACS analysis approach will be
presented alongside the gamma, beta, alpha change framework given that this invariance
testing process simply explicates the specific models that are tested when assessing ГBA
change.
Gamma change refers to an inconsistency in respondents‟ understanding of the
construct over time. Gamma change has been defined as “a redefinition or
reconceptualization of some domain, a major change in the perspective or frame of
reference within which phenomena are perceived and classified, in what is taken to be
relevant in some slice of reality” (Golembiewski et al., 1976, p. 135). For example, an
employee completing a communication skills inventory before participating in a training
aimed at fostering those very skills may perceive communication skills as a
unidimensional construct, but when completing the same measure after the training, s/he
may conceptualize the construct as multidimensional (e.g., interpersonal skills, writing
skills). Empirically, gamma change results in a different number of factors or items
representing different factors at different time points (Riordan, Richardson, Schaffer, &
Vandenberg, 2001). In a LMACS analysis, gamma change can be tested by specifying
and estimating the same factor structure at each time point. If there is no change in the
number of factors or in the items serving as indicators for different factors at the different
time points, configural invariance is established (Millsap & Meredith, 2007). Given
configural invariance, one can next examine if the values representing the relationship
between the factor and the indicator (e.g., factor pattern coefficients) are equivalent over
time (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). However, if there is a change in the number of
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factors or items are representing different factors at different time points, then one cannot
proceed to this next stage of assessing longitudinal stability because one would be
comparing conceptually different constructs (Chan, 2003). Thus, it is crucial that there is
no gamma change (i.e., configural invariance is established across time) in order to assess
beta change.
Beta change occurs when the respondents‟ definition and conceptualization of the
construct being measured is the same across testing occasions (i.e., no gamma change),
but respondents use the response scale differently across time. Specifically, respondents
use the scale one way initially, but then they “shrink” or “stretch” the scale during
subsequent administrations of the measure, thus recalibrating their use of the scale
(Golembiewski et al., 1976). For instance, beta change would occur if a respondent‟s
understanding and level of the latent construct entitlement did not change across time, yet
the respondent chose different response categories when responding to the same items
representing entitlement at two time points. Thus, the respondent‟s observed item scores
change across occasions, even though his or her actual latent level on the construct
remains the same. In LMACS framework, such inconsistency is assessed via metric and
scalar invariance tests (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). Metric invariance requires that the
values of factor pattern coefficients (i.e., factor loadings) be of the same magnitude
across testing occasions, which implies the items have equivalent saliency to the factor
across time (Millsap & Meredith, 2007). In other words, establishing metric invariance
implies that an item is equally representative of the underlying construct at each time
point. At least partial metric invariance needs to be established before one could proceed
with subsequent invariance testing (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). Scalar invariance
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requires that the values of intercepts (i.e., the observed item score when the latent
variable underlying the item has a value of zero) of corresponding items be of the same
magnitude across time, which means that given an equal representation of the construct
by the items across time points (i.e., metric and scalar invariance), responses to the items
will be equally indicative of the construct (factor) they represent (Millsap & Meredith,
2007). For example, given configural, metric, and scalar invariance, a person whose
latent level of entitlement truly did not change across two time points should provide the
same observed responses at Time 1 and Time 2. By contrast, if s/he actually increased or
decreased on entitlement (change at the latent level), s/he should respond differently to
the items across time. Thus, establishing both metric and scalar invariance implies that
observed mean change is reflecting latent mean change. That is, the absence of beta
change allows the researcher to make valid inferences about latent mean stability of the
construct, based on presence or absence of changes in observed scores over time (Riordan
et al., 2001).
Latent mean stability. Given no gamma or beta change, one can assess alpha
change. Alpha change “involves a variation in the level of some existential state, given a
constantly calibrated measuring instrument related to a constant conceptual domain”
(Golembiewski et al., 1967, p. 134). That is, the instrument measures the construct
equally well from one administration to the next, yet respondents‟ scores vary across
testing occasions (mean change in observed scores across time is present). In the case of
alpha change, a change in a respondent‟s observed score across time is inferred to reflect
a change in the amount of the underlying construct across time. Thus, by definition,
alpha change requires the absence of both beta and gamma change (Riordan et al., 2001).
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Essentially, alpha change is what researchers are typically interested in assessing,
and often this is assessed using observed variable techniques such as repeated measures
ANOVA to estimate the observed mean difference in scores across time. Fortunately, in
a structural equation modeling framework, latent mean stability can be assessed via
LMACS analysis by estimating the latent mean difference or the difference between
means at the construct level across time (Chan, 1998). Thus, LMACS analysis allows for
the simultaneous estimation of latent means alongside the parameters analyzed for
measurement invariance (factor structure, factor pattern coefficients, and intercepts).
Moreover, modeling variables at the latent level accounts for measurement error in the
indicators, and therefore estimates of mean difference over time will be more accurate
than those produced by observed variable techniques which assume no measurement
error (DeShon, 1998; Hancock, 1997). See Chan (2003) and Ployhart and Oswald (2004)
for a more detailed review of the advantages of latent variable techniques over traditional
observed variable methods in longitudinal research.
Latent rank-order consistency. Another indicator of the stability of a construct
is high consistency of scores across time. That is, the degree to which the rank ordering
of respondents on the construct is preserved from one time point to another can be
estimated by computing a stability coefficient (i.e., the correlation of respondents‟ scores
across two time points). Rank-order consistency should only be estimated after
establishing both configural and metric invariance (scalar invariance is not necessary
because estimates of consistency do not involve means). Researchers often report and
interpret the Pearson product moment correlation coefficient, which is based on observed
data. Similar to the difference tests that focus on change in observed scores described
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above, the correlation coefficient obtained from observed variables will be biased
because of measurement error. Alternatively, estimating the correlation between the
latent variable (factor) at time 1 and time 2 will result in a more accurate estimate of
rank-order consistency.
Example of Assessing Construct Stability: Psychological Entitlement
Understanding the process of assessing longitudinal invariance and factor stability
is best facilitated by an example. Below I demonstrate how to apply LMACS analysis to
assess the stability of psychological entitlement over two time points, 1.5 years apart.
Psychological entitlement is an especially suitable construct, given the current interest in
the construct, the need to gather validity evidence for a popular existing measure of
entitlement, and most importantly, the lack of empirical support behind the claims that
psychological entitlement is stable over time.
Definition of psychological entitlement and its importance. An entitled
individual is someone who has “unreasonable expectations of especially favorable
treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations” (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).
With respect to stability, a popular definition of psychological entitlement is “a stable and
pervasive sense that one deserves more and is entitled to more than others” (W. K.
Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004, p. 31). This definition suggests
that psychological entitlement is both stable and non-context-specific. Indeed, one can
encounter psychologically entitled people in many contexts. For example, children may
express a strong feeling of entitlement to Christmas presents, new toys, or candy.
Teenagers, on the other hand, may feel entitled to privacy or attention. Young adults
entering the work force may feel entitled to a promotion and vacation time during the
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first few months on the job. These are but a few examples of situations where one can
witness a clash of interests due to the perception of “due” favorable treatment by
psychologically entitled individuals.
Previous research has linked entitlement to a host of maladaptive attitudes,
affects, and behaviors. To name a few, psychological entitlement has been positively
related to aggression, acquisitiveness, selfish behaviors in relationships (W. K. Campbell
et al., 2004), job-related frustration and coworker abuse (Harvey & Harris, 2010), and
negatively related to humility, focus on others (Elliott, 2010), agreeableness, and
emotional stability (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004). Clearly, psychological entitlement is a
construct worthy of investigation. Moreover, considering the multitude of undesirable
attitudes, affects, and behaviors that psychological entitlement has been related to, it is
important to empirically test the claim of stability. That is, if psychological entitlement is
stable over time, then entitled individuals will most likely remain entitled throughout
their lives, which negatively impacts other people. By contrast, if psychological
entitlement is malleable (i.e., not stable), experiences that lower levels of psychological
entitlement could be sought.
Evidence regarding the stability of entitlement. Authors of the Psychological
Entitlement Scale (PES), currently the most popular measure of psychological
entitlement, claim that psychological entitlement is “a chronic or stable disposition rather
than a response to a specific social situation” (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004, p. 35).
Interestingly, the authors of the PES provide no theoretical rationale as to why
psychological entitlement is stable. In support of their claim of the stability of
entitlement over time, W. K. Campbell and colleagues (2004) conducted two studies, in
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which the PES was administered to participants twice. In one study, the two test
administrations were 1 month apart, and produced a test-retest correlation coefficient of
.72. In the other study, the PES administrations were 2 months apart, and the test-retest
stability coefficient was .70. Based on this evidence, W. K. Campbell and colleagues
(2004) concluded that psychological entitlement is indeed stable over time. No other
longitudinal research has been conducted to support or challenge the authors‟ conclusion.
Thus, the empirical evidence supporting the stability of psychological entitlement is
limited at best.
Not only is the evidence gathered by W. K. Campbell and colleagues limited, but
the interpretation of these test-retest correlation coefficients may be invalid. Recall that
in order to assess rank order-consistency, certain assumptions must be met to ensure that
no conceptual or measurement inconsistencies affect the results; configural and metric
invariance must be established. W. K. Campbell and colleagues did not test these
assumptions. Moreover, in order to fully assess the stability of a construct, test-retest
stability should be coupled with an assessment of mean-level change. Although W. K.
Campbell and colleagues reported observed means at Time 1 and Time 2, they did not
interpret or discuss observed mean differences. Of course, the computation and
interpretation of mean change requires that the researchers establish configural, metric,
and scalar invariance; these invariance tests were not conducted. Considering the
insufficiency of evidence regarding the stability of psychological entitlement, further
empirical investigation is needed prior to making claims about construct stability.
The Current Study
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Purpose. The purpose the current study was to demonstrate the assessment of
construct stability by examining psychological entitlement over the course of
approximately 1.5 years. The multi-step process of LMACS analysis was employed, as
these steps align with the assessment of stability, which are reflected in the three research
questions below.
Research question 1: Is the unidimensional model of entitlement championed by
the creators of the PES empirically supported at two time points? To answer this
question, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted on PES scores collected at Time 1
and 1.5 years later at Time 2. Given the same factor model fit the PES scores at both
time points, configural invariance was supported, and the analyses proceeded to the next
stage (Figure 2).
Research question 2: Does the PES function equivalently across time? Given a
comparable factor structure at both time points, I tested for equal factor pattern
coefficient values across time (metric invariance) and equal item intercepts across time
(scalar invariance). Based on these results, full metric and partial scalar invariance were
established, and the analyses proceeded to the final stage (Figure 3).
Research question 3: Given longitudinal measurement invariance of the PES,
does psychological entitlement increase or decrease over 1.5 years? Because only partial
scalar invariance was established, a test of the latent mean difference in entitlement from
Time 1 to Time 2 was conducted using LMACS analysis both with and without scalar
non-invariant items contributing to the latent mean to determine whether entitlement
changes on average and to assess the effect of scalar non-invariance. Moreover, using
LMACS analysis, the correlation between the entitlement factors across time was
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examined to assess whether the rank order of respondents remained consistent across
time.

Chapter II
Review of the Literature of Psychological Entitlement
The term “entitlement” was first used in the early 1800‟s in the context of legal
affairs, pertaining to one‟s rights to social benefits as regulated by law or social norms.
This original meaning has been fully preserved to this day, as we often hear people talk
about entitlement programs (e.g., Social Security, Medicare). What has occurred since
that time is the emergence of a different, yet related term—“psychological entitlement”.
The term “psychological entitlement” emerged fairly recently (early 90s), but the
concept dates back to 1916, when Freud first labeled a group of patients, who felt they
were special, “the exceptions” (Freud, 1916). Psychological entitlement is different from
the conceptualization of entitlement as regulated by law or social norms in that
psychological entitlement represents a sense or expectation that one should receive favors
and/or special treatment from others that entitled individuals deem reasonable and
justified, when in fact they aren‟t. According to Freud, these patients must have been
wronged in the past, and thus they expect special treatment.
Jacobson (1959) agreed with Freud‟s theory that these patients must have been
wronged in the past, but he also added that individuals like Freud‟s patients perceived
themselves as “blessed” with unusual beauty and talent, and thus, were not to be expected
to adhere to rules like everyone else. Horney (1950) labeled these expectations of special
treatment “neurotic claims” and stated that for these patients “a wish or need, in itself
quite understandable, turns into a claim” (p. 42). In order to claim something, one must
have a somewhat legitimate reason to make that claim. A problem arises with
psychologically entitled individuals, however, because they deem their claims or
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expectations justified or legitimate, when, in fact, they aren‟t. For example, a student
may feel entitled to graduate from college simply because s/he was admitted to the
university and paid tuition. Such an expectation is certainly not justified. In comparison,
an example of justified entitlement is public education in the U.S. Every American
citizen is entitled to public education, as regulated by law. As such, justified entitlement
is typically inclusive—justified entitlement pertains to everyone in a group defined by
law or social norms (e.g., social security). Unjustified or psychological entitlement, on
the other hand, tends to be exclusive—psychologically entitled individuals believe they
stand out from the group, they are special, and therefore they should be treated
preferentially.
Because entitled individuals are not isolated from others, these unjustified
expectations affect others. In the context of distributive justice, or justice as it pertains to
the allocation of goods in society, such expectations may lead to a situation of inequity.
According to equity theory (Adams, 1965), people experience inequity when they
perceive that the ratio of their outcomes (e.g., salary, benefits) to inputs (e.g., effort,
skills) and the ratio of others‟ outcomes to inputs are unequal. Research on equity
sensitivity empirically categorized people according to their level of tolerance to
inequity: a) benevolent, people who prefer their outcome/income ratios to be lower than
those of others, b) equity sensitive, people who prefer their outcome/income ratios to be
the same as those of others, and c) entitled, people who experience distress when their
outcome/income ratios are not higher than those of others (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles,
1987; Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman, 1989). The last category defines individuals who are
psychologically entitled, because their expectations and claims of a greater portion of the
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pie are not justified. Having established the distinction between justified (e.g.,
entitlement programs such as social security) and unjustified (psychological) entitlement,
the origins and initial study of psychological entitlement will be reviewed next, since it is
the construct under investigation in the current study.
The Emergence of Psychological Entitlement as a Construct
Psychological entitlement as a component of narcissism. Feelings of being
“exceptional”, “special”, and “unique” as exhibited by psychologically entitled
individuals, also appear to be symptoms of a personality disorder that was given much
attention by clinical psychologists and psychoanalytic practitioners in the last century—
the narcissistic personality disorder (NPD). The interest in NPD granted the disorder its
inclusion in the third edition of the American Psychiatric Association‟s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association,
1980). The DSM-III (1980) describes a narcissistic individual as one displaying
“characteristic disturbances in interpersonal relationships, such as feelings of entitlement,
interpersonal exploitativeness, relationships that alternate between the extremes of
overidealization and devaluation, and lack of empathy” (p. 315). According to this
definition, psychological entitlement can be considered a component of narcissism. This
conceptualization is further supported by certain criteria in the DSM-III (1980) for
diagnosing someone with NPD, such as “grandiose sense of self-importance and
uniqueness, e.g., exaggeration of achievements and talents” and “preoccupation with
fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love” (p. 317). These
criteria align with Freud‟s categorizing of patients expecting special treatment as the
“exceptions” (Freud, 1916), as well as Jacobson‟s addition of the self-perceived
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possession of unseen beauty and talent by such individuals (Jacobson, 1959). Whether it
is because narcissists believe they are simply “the exception” or worth more than others,
they typically feel entitled to things: “Entitlement, the expectation of special favors
without assuming reciprocal responsibilities, is usually present” (DSM-III, 1980, p. 316).
This clinical definition of psychological entitlement is consistent with Huseman, Hatfield,
and Miles‟ (1987) description of entitled people, as expecting more than they contribute.
As more research was conducted on narcissism and entitlement, entitlement grew into an
area of interest of its own, rather than simply as a component of narcissism.
Psychological entitlement as an independent construct worthy of study. Over
the last couple of decades, interest in psychological entitlement has increased. This rising
interest is reflected in both the popular press and psychological research. A
Lexis/NexisTM (2010) search of the term “sense of entitlement” returned 831 results in
major newspapers and magazines between the years 1990 and 2000, compared to over
3000 results between 2000 and 2010. The increased focus on entitlement has resulted in
a better understanding of the construct. For example, although entitlement is still listed
as a criterion for the diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder in the most current
version of the DSM (DSM-IV-TR), entitlement‟s definition has changed. Formerly,
entitlement was defined as “the expectation of special favors without assuming reciprocal
responsibilities” (DSM-III, 1980). Currently, an entitled individual is defined as
someone who has “unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or
automatic compliance with his or her expectations” (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). The current
definition of entitlement is different from the former definition in that the current
definition amplifies the scope of expectations inherent in entitled individuals. The simple
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idea of expecting special favors without reciprocating has grown into a set of beliefs that
are “unreasonable” and involve “especially favorable treatment” and “automatic
compliance”. As such, the current definition of entitlement reflects a deeper
understanding of entitlement among researchers, and more importantly, one that portrays
entitlement more negatively than before.
In addition to this revised definition of entitlement, conceptualizations of both
general psychological entitlement and context-specific entitlement have emerged. A
construct that is considered general is not specific to any domain or situation, but is
rather universal, manifesting itself in a wide range of settings, virtually independent of
the situation. By contrast, a construct that is considered context-specific is heavily
dependent on the situation and is only typical of the domain to which it was specified.
One will likely encounter people with high levels of entitlement in a wide variety of
contexts. At the workplace, for instance, an employee may feel entitled to extra vacation
days or approval of late arrivals to work. Such attitudes and behaviors are rarely
tolerated, and can often lead to interpersonal tension or even conflict with supervisors and
coworkers. Another example is academic entitlement or “a sense of entitlement specific
to education” (Kopp, Zinn, Finney & Jurich, 2011). An entitled student may expect a
passing grade in the course simply because s/he attended class throughout the semester.
These are two different types of context- specific entitlement. That is, think about a
student who is working while attending college. The working student may feel entitled in
one context, but not the other. For example, the student may be academically entitled,
but not feel entitled at the workplace, or vice versa.
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Alternatively, a person may feel entitled across a variety of contexts, thus
exemplifying the aforementioned general, non-context-specific entitlement. General
attitudes and affects are lasting beliefs, convictions, or viewpoints that are independent of
the context or the situation at hand. A person‟s level on a latent variable that is noncontext-specific should remain fairly similar in magnitude (i.e., intensity) and direction
(e.g., positive or negative) across situations or contexts.
It is important to study entitlement with respect to specificity. That is, empirical
studies of a construct at different levels of measurement specificity allow the researcher
to examine the extent to which the construct is general, context-specific, or both
(Baranik, Barron, & Finney, 2010). With respect to psychological entitlement, research
employing measures of both general and context-specific entitlement is very limited
(Chowning & N. J. Campbell, 2009; Greenberger, Lessard, Chen, & Farruggia, 2008;
Kopp, Zinn, Finney, & Jurich, 2011). Nonetheless, in all three papers, general
entitlement and context-specific (e.g., academic) entitlement are moderately correlated.
Therefore, it is important that researchers continue to study general psychological
entitlement in addition to context-specific entitlement.
Justified Entitlement vs. Unjustified Entitlement vs. Deservingness
It is important to clarify the differences between three related concepts—justified
entitlement, unjustified (psychological) entitlement, and deservingness. Above, the
distinction between justified and unjustified entitlement was established. However, the
introduction of the concept “deservingness” often causes confusion among all three
terms, and thus requires some clarification.
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In everyday language, the terms “entitlement” and “deservingness” are often used
interchangeably. For example, one may say “I deserve a raise” or “I am entitled to a
raise”. Both statements convey one‟s expectation of a higher salary in the future.
However, there are conceptual differences as to whether one is said to be “deserving of”
something, or to be “entitled to” something. Moreover, recall that entitlement can be
justified (e.g., social security) or unjustified (e.g., psychological entitlement). A good
approach to highlighting the distinction between justified entitlement, deservingness, and
unjustified (psychological) entitlement is asking why. Why should I expect a raise? If I
expect a raise because I have worked extra hard, and have increased sales by 20%, then I
may truly deserve a raise. Alternatively, if I expect a raise because I have been with the
company for two years and such is the company‟s rule (to increase salary after two years
of employment), then my entitlement may be justified. However, if I expect a raise
because I feel that I am inherently worth more than other employees, or because I am
innately special, then I am likely exhibiting a sense of unjustified or psychological
entitlement.
There is a fair amount of research to support the first of the two distinctions—
justified entitlement vs. deservingness. Feather (2003) proposed that judgments of
deservingness relate to outcomes that are “earned or achieved as products of a person‟s
actions”, whereas judgments of entitlement are guided by “agreed-upon body of law,
social norms, and formal and informal rules”. Defined this way, Feather‟s
conceptualization of entitlement aligns with the justified entitlement presented above.
Following this framework of defining entitlement and deservingness, it appears that the
term “deservingness” is to be used when someone is personally responsible for the
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outcome, whereas the term “entitlement” (whether justified or not) applies to situations
that are independent of one‟s actions. For example, an employee may feel that s/he
should receive a bonus at the end of the year for two different reasons: a) because s/he
put forth a great amount of effort to produce high-quality work and demonstrated
performance on the job beyond expectations, or b) company policy grants every
employee with an end-of-year bonus calculated as a percentage of an employee‟s wages,
regardless of work performance. In the first case, the employee is said to be deserving of
the bonus because of his or her actions (i.e., producing high-quality work, exceeding
expectations). In the second case, the employee is said to be entitled to the bonus
because the company is supposed to give a bonus to every employee, independent of the
quantity and quality of work done. In other words, the entitled employee perceives that
the positive outcome (i.e., the bonus) is not so much his or her own responsibility, but
rather an expected outcome based on the company‟s policy (i.e., end-of-year bonus for
all).
To test the conceptual distinction between justified entitlement and deservingness
empirically, Feather (2003) conducted two studies to examine whether participants were
actually able to distinguish between entitlement and deservingness. In one of the studies,
participants were given a scenario of a student running for election in a national student
organization, where the student exerted high vs. low effort, was eligible or not eligible to
run for election by virtue of age, and was either elected or not elected (Feather, 2003). In
the other study, participants were presented with a scenario, where a person suffering
from an illness was to decide how to divide his will among his son, nephew, or friend,
who provided him with help or limited help. In both studies participants‟ reactions to the
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respective scenario were evaluated by asking participants to complete ratings of justified
entitlement and deservingness. Results from both studies showed that participants were
able to distinguish between justified entitlement and deservingness by giving high ratings
of justified entitlement when the outcome involved an external network of rights, norms,
and social norms (e.g., age eligibility), and giving high ratings of deservingness when the
outcome involved personal responsibility (e.g., actions such as effort).
The distinction between deservingness and unjustified (psychological) entitlement
is equally important, yet it has not been supported by any research. What is more, the
distinction between these two concepts should be even more apparent than the distinction
between deservingness and justified entitlement that was just presented. As discussed
above, deservingness is associated with personal responsibility and merit. Someone who
feels deserving of a reward actually did the work to deserve the reward. By contrast,
unjustified or psychological entitlement has nothing to do with personal responsibility or
merit—it is entirely based on one‟s self-concept of being inherently special, precious, and
exceptional. For example, a person may feel they should receive an award for two very
different reasons: 1) because s/he put forth a great amount of effort and contributed to
many accomplishments in the area; 2) because s/he is inherently a special person who
should receive awards regardless of accomplishments. In the first case, the person is said
to be deserving of the award because of his or her actions (i.e., effort, accomplishments).
In the second case, the person is said to be feeling unjustified entitlement for the award
because s/he had no contributions or accomplishments. In other words, the entitled
individual expects the positive outcome (i.e., the award) without assuming responsibility
for the work or conducting the work; s/he expects the positive outcome because s/he feels
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innately special. This shift of responsibility has been conceptualized as externalized
responsibility. In the context of education, externalized responsibility has been defined
as the lack of responsibility for one‟s education (Chowning & N. J. Campbell, 2009).
Not surprisingly, several measures of general (non-context-specific) unjustified
entitlement correlated positively with externalized responsibility (rs = .29 to .38)
indicating that unjustified entitlement is related to a lack of a sense of personal
responsibility (Chowning & N. J. Campbell, 2009). Because the current research is
focused on psychological (unjustified) entitlement, understanding the distinction between
deservingness and unjustified entitlement is important. As explained below,
distinguishing between these two constructs when constructing psychological entitlement
measures is an area that needs further attention.
It is extremely important to characterize measures of “entitlement” as to what they
actually represent: deservingness, unjustified (psychological) entitlement, or some
combination of the two. A measure of psychological entitlement would have a different
nomological net than a measure of deservingness. For example, one would expect people
scoring high on a measure representing psychological entitlement to score low or
moderate on a measure of effort, because effort has practically nothing to do with the
expectation of rewards or resources. On the contrary, people scoring high on a measure
representing deservingness should score high on a measure of effort because unlike
entitlement, deservingness and effort go hand in hand. When a measure confounds
deservingness and psychological entitlement, one is unable to hypothesize the
relationship between scores on the confounded measure and scores on external measures
(e.g., effort). Confounding of this kind would potentially prevent the researcher from
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accurately establishing or expanding a construct‟s nomological net. To ensure that this
does not take place, measures should be carefully examined with respect to construct
validity before use.
Measurement of Psychological Entitlement
With the growing interest in psychological entitlement and its emergence from
simply a component of narcissism to an important independent construct, researchers
have created several instruments to measure the construct. Because the focus of the
current study is on general, non-context-specific psychological entitlement, only
measures representing general psychological entitlement are reviewed.
NPI Entitlement subscale (Raskin & Terry, 1988). The Narcissistic
Personality Inventory (NPI) was developed by Raskin and Terry in 1988 as a measure of
narcissism in non-clinical populations. The NPI consists of seven factors: entitlement,
authority, exhibitionism, exploitativeness, self-sufficiency, superiority, and vanity. The
Entitlement subscale consists of six forced-choice items (e.g., “I will never be satisfied
until I get all that I deserve” versus “I will take my satisfactions as they come”; Raskin &
Terry, 1988). The authors‟ definition of entitlement was “the expectation of special
privileges over others and special exemptions from normal social demands.”
Unfortunately, this definition does not appear to align very well with the content of the
NPI Entitlement items. Items such as “If I ruled the world it would be a better place” and
“I have a strong will to power” indicate seeking of authority, dominance, and power—not
a sense of entitlement. Further, the item “I will never be satisfied until I get all that I
deserve” certainly confounds entitlement and deservingness. If a respondent is truly
deserving of outcomes and thus strongly endorses this item, then the item is indicative of
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the respondent‟s sense of deservingness, not his or her expectations of special privileges
and exemptions (what the authors define as entitlement). Conceptual confounding of this
type, in addition to the mismatch between the definition of the construct and the content
of the items used to measure the construct (lack of face validity), as well as psychometric
issues associated with the development of the NPI (see W. K. Campbell et al., 2004 for
review) have resulted in concerns about the quality of the NPI Entitlement subscale as a
measure of entitlement (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004; Pryor, Miller, & Gaughan, 2008;
Watson & Biderman, 1993). Despite the measure‟s flaws, it is important to mention the
NPI when discussing the measurement of psychological entitlement because before the
emergence of entitlement as an independent construct, the NPI Entitlement subscale was
the most popular instrument used to study entitlement, and thus it cannot be ignored.
Yet, the issues associated with the measure indicate that research on psychological
entitlement conducted using the NPI may be difficult to interpret. Thus, a better measure
of psychological entitlement is needed.
Psychological Entitlement Scale (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004). With the
increasing interest in entitlement as an independent construct and in an attempt to resolve
some of the issues associated with the NPI Entitlement subscale, W. K. Campbell and
colleagues (2004) developed a stand-alone measure of entitlement—the Psychological
Entitlement Scale (PES). The PES consists of 9 Likert items with responses ranging
from 1 (“strong disagreement) to 7 (“strong agreement”). The authors defined
psychological entitlement as “a stable and pervasive sense that one deserves more and is
entitled to more than others” (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004). With respect to the
distinction between justified and unjustified, as well as general and context-specific
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entitlement, the PES can be considered a measure of unjustified, non-context-specific
entitlement, based on the following statement by the authors: “Our concept of
psychological entitlement is intrapsychically pervasive or global; it does not necessarily
refer to entitlement that results from a specific situation (e.g., “I am entitled to social
security because I paid into the system,” or “I deserve an „A‟ because I performed well in
class”)” (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004, p. 31).
With respect to the distinction between entitlement and deservingness, the authors
state: “our concept of psychological entitlement includes both the experience of being
deserving and entitled.” Although they acknowledge the difference between the two
terms (“deservingness typically reflects the expectation of a reward in exchange of one‟s
own efforts or character, whereas entitlement typically reflects the expectation of a
reward as a result of a social contract”, W. K. Campbell et al., 2004), the authors of the
PES used the terms interchangeably in the 9 PES items (e.g., “I honestly feel I‟m just
more deserving than others”, “I feel entitled to more of everything”). Recall that to
evaluate whether one is deserving vs. psychologically entitled to an outcome I asked the
question why. A quick glance through the PES items (see Appendix) highlights that one
is unable to answer this question, and therefore cannot determine whether the items are
measuring entitlement or deservingness. For example, why am I more deserving than
others? Am I more “deserving” because I actually put forth more effort than others, or
simply because I am special? Different answers to the question “why” will result in a
different interpretation of a strong endorsement of this item. That is, if a respondent
believes that s/he is more deserving than others because s/he put forth more effort than
others, then her or his strong endorsement of the item would indicate a high level of
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deservingness. Alternatively, if one endorses the item due to a feeling of being special,
then the strong endorsement would be interpreted as a high level of psychological
entitlement. Despite the likely confound of psychological entitlement and deservingness
inherent in the measure, the PES remains the best available stand-alone measure of
general psychological entitlement. Since its publication in 2004, the PES has been used
in over 20 published studies.
Although much research has been conducted on psychological entitlement in the
past few years and a good deal of this work employed the PES, there remains a question
regarding the stability of the construct over time. Research efforts in the domain of
psychological entitlement have largely focused on expanding entitlement‟s nomological
net (i.e., investigating how entitlement relates to other constructs). Although such
research is of great importance, it would also be useful to know if psychological
entitlement increases, decreases, or remains approximately the same over time. Authors
of the PES claim psychological entitlement is stable: “we consider psychological
entitlement to reflect a chronic or stable disposition rather than a response to a specific
social situation” (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004, p. 35). It appears from this description
that psychological entitlement could be considered a rather steady personality
characteristic (trait). In order to assess this argument, next I discuss the distinction
between trait and state-line personality attributes.
Trait vs. State
When studying a construct, it is important that one understands how likely it is for
the construct to change over a long time period. With respect to changeability, constructs
are often categorized as trait, state, or both. Traits constitute attributes in individuals that
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are relatively stable across occasions (Hertzog & Nesselroade, 1987). Spielberger (1972,
1975, 1983) described personality traits as enduring individual differences in people or
tendencies to perceive the world in a certain way and dispositions to react or behave in a
particular fashion with predictable regularity. Trait anxiety, for example, falls in the
category of traits, because it is characterized by constant worry and uneasiness.
States comprise attributes in individuals that are relatively changeable over time
or occasions (Hertzog & Nesselroade, 1987). Spielberger (1972, 1975, 1983) defined
personality states as transitory conditions that exist at a given moment at a certain
intensity level. As such, states are often thought to be situation-specific. State anxiety,
for example, only occurs in certain conditions (e.g., test anxiety occurs in the context of
completing a test).
Given that traits and states are very different in nature (i.e., traits are stable,
whereas states are transitory, changeable attributes), examining longitudinal stability can
provide some insight into whether a construct is a trait or a state (Conley, 1984; Meyer &
Shack, 1989; Nesselroade, 1986). Given that traits are stable, enduring attributes, a trait
construct is expected to demonstrate high rank-order consistency and little mean-change
over time (except when traits are measured during a developmental stage; Ozar & Gjerde,
1989). On the other hand, given that states are attributes transitory in nature, such
constructs are expected to demonstrate less stability when measured at different times or
occasions (Usala & Hertzog, 1991).
The importance of studying the temporal stability of constructs has been shown
by many researchers. Veenhoven (1994), for example, investigated whether happiness
was a fixed trait or a variable state, and found that over a short period of time happiness
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was stable, but over longer periods of time it was not. This finding is important because
it demonstrates that constructs are not always easy to categorize as either trait or state,
and often empirical evidence from longitudinal studies determines how the construct is
conceptualized over the course of human development.
Existing Claims and Evidence Regarding the Stability of Psychological Entitlement
Although psychological entitlement has been the subject of much study, little
research has been devoted to assessing the temporal stability of the construct. For this
reason, all available research on entitlement‟s stability over time will be reviewed.
Moreover, stability research on the construct that is next of kin to entitlement—
narcissism—will also be reviewed. That is, because entitlement was first defined as a
component of narcissism and later studied in the context of narcissism, examining the
stability of narcissism should provide additional insight into the stability of entitlement
across time.
Research on the stability of entitlement across time. The study of entitlement
as an independent construct was largely influenced by the development of the
Psychological Entitlement Scale (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004). Recall that the authors
defined psychological entitlement as “a stable and pervasive sense that one deserves more
and is entitled to more than others” (p. 35). The researchers further state: “we consider
psychological entitlement to reflect a chronic or stable disposition rather than a response
to a specific social situation” (p.35). It appears that the authors conceptualize entitlement
as a personality trait; however, no theoretical explanation is provided as to why
entitlement should be considered a stable trait. Empirically, there was some evidence of
relative stability of entitlement across time. Specifically, two different samples were
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administered the PES at two time points, 1 month apart for one sample, and 2 months
apart for the other sample. The results yielded rank-order consistency coefficients of .72
and .70, respectively, leading the authors to the conclusion that “the PES is stable over
time” (W. K. Campbell et al., 2004). With respect to mean-level change in entitlement
across time, PES scores at baseline were 28.8 and 27.7 and increased to 30.3 (1 month
later) and 30.6 (2 months later) upon subsequent testing (scale ranges from 7 to 63). No
interpretations of these mean-level changes were provided by the researchers.
Zitek and colleagues (2010) proposed that psychological entitlement is not just a
chronic disposition, but can also be a dynamic mindset. They suggested that “an
individual can also vary in the extent to which s/he feels entitled in the course of any
given day, depending on what past experiences are salient in the individual‟s mind when
the opportunity for selfish behavior presents itself” (Zitek, Jordan, Monin, & Leach,
2010, p. 246). The authors supported this view of psychological entitlement through a
series of experiments in a repeated measures design, where participants expressed higher
levels of psychological entitlement (represented by several adapted PES items) when they
were wronged, or even reminded of a time when they were wronged. Thus, these studies
provide some evidence that psychological entitlement may not be as “pervasive and
stable” as defined by W. K. Campbell and colleagues (2004) but rather may be situationspecific, or state-like.
Research on the stability of narcissism across time. Given the limited
empirical evidence regarding the stability of psychological entitlement, the stability of
narcissism is reviewed next as a source of evidence for the temporal stability of a
construct close to entitlement in the nomological net. Given that narcissism was included
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in the DSM-III-R and DSM-IV-TR as a personality disorder, and all personality disorders
stem from maladaptive personality traits (DSM-III-R, 1980), one would expect
narcissism to be relatively stable over time. Consistent with the initial interest in
narcissism in clinical populations, the first instance of studying narcissism over time was
with patients diagnosed with clinical narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).
Ronningstam, Gunderson, and Lyons (1995) studied 20 NPD patients over the course of
3 years, and found that for 12 of the patients, levels of pathological narcissism as
measured by the NPD criteria in the DSM-III-R and DSM-IV decreased by over 50%,
and remained unchanged for the other 8 patients. Moreover, the qualitative research
accompanying the study revealed that corrective achievements (e.g., graduations,
promotions, recognitions, acceptance to sought-after schools, programs, or positions, etc.)
were the most common type of event that contributed to the decrease in pathological
entitlement (Ronningstam et al., 1995).
Another stability study of narcissism was conducted a decade later using the
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988). Del Rosario and White
(2005) administered the NPI to a college population at baseline, and again 13 weeks later.
The authors reported rank-order consistency coefficients for the full 40-item NPI scale, as
well as for each of the seven subscales. The entire NPI scale demonstrated high testretest stability (r = .81), and test-retest stability coefficients for most of the subscales
ranged from high moderate (r = .70-.80) to low moderate (r = .60-.70), with entitlement
being the component of narcissism with lowest stability (r = .57). The researchers
concluded that the NPI scale and its subscales demonstrated satisfactory stability,
indicating that narcissism and its components remained more or less stable over time, as

34
expected (del Rosario & White, 2005). It should be noted, however, that one could
question the utility and interpretability of an overall NPI stability coefficient, considering
the wide range of test-retest stability coefficients among the subscales.
In a study examining the psychometric properties of the Italian version of the NPI,
Fossati, Borroni, and Maffei (2008) reported test-retest stability for the full NPI scale for
a clinical and a non-clinical population over the course of three months: the stability
coefficient for the non-clinical sample was higher (r = .87) than it was in the clinical
sample (r = .72). Nonetheless, this study lends further support that narcissism, as
measured by the NPI, may be relatively stable over time. However, as mentioned above,
it seems it would be more meaningful to present and interpret stability coefficients for the
NPI subscales individually.
In sum, there are few studies assessing the stability of entitlement and narcissism
over time. Moreover, the few empirical findings do not appear to align with the
commonly accepted theoretical conceptualization of psychological entitlement.
Specifically, W. K. Campbell and colleagues (2004) defined entitlement as “stable” but
provided no theoretical justification for this classification. Furthermore, the empirical
evidence they presented is insufficient to support their claim for several reasons. First,
they did not assess measurement invariance across time. Thus, any rank-order
consistency coefficients or mean-level change estimates may be uninterpretable. Second,
the authors deemed test-retest consistency coefficients to be sufficient evidence that the
construct is stable, without interpreting the mean-level change in entitlement from
baseline to 1 and 2 months, respectively, in both samples.
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Similar limitations are associated with the stability studies using the NPI (del
Rosario & White, 2005; Fossati et al., 2008). First, there have been no studies of
longitudinal measurement invariance of the NPI. Second, del Rosario and White (2005)
reported high moderate (r = .70 - .80) to low moderate (r = .60 - .70) test-retest
consistency coefficients for six of the subscales, and the lowest coefficient (r = .57) for
the entitlement subscale. Because of the discrepancies of the coefficient values across
subscales, the high overall stability coefficient for the full scale is difficult to interpret.
Moreover, del Rosario and White did not interpret mean-level change. Such isolated
results make it difficult to determine whether the entitlement construct is stable or not.
Clearly, further study is needed to address these issues and provide more empirical
evidence.
Is psychological entitlement stable over long periods of time? Both empirical
findings and theory suggest that some individual differences may be highly stable over
short periods of time but less stable as the time interval between testing occasions
increases (Fraley & Roberts, 2005; Veenhoven, 1994). Recall that when studied over 1
or 2 month periods, entitlement‟s test-retest consistency was .72 and .70, respectively. In
addition, when studied as a component of narcissism and assessed over a 13-week time
period, entitlement was associated with the lowest stability coefficient (r =. 57). These
results may suggest that over short periods of time, entitlement may be indeed stable;
however, over long periods of time (>1 year), entitlement may not be as stable. Given
the limited empirical evidence and theoretical background on psychological entitlement, I
believe that entitlement will not be stable over a longer period of time (e.g., 1.5 or 2
years).

Chapter III
Methods
Data Collection Procedure
Responses to the PES were collected from college students at a mid-sized
southeastern university as part of a large-scale testing session for institutional
accountability purposes (U.S. Department of Education, 2006). Specifically, in order to
examine the “value-added” due to attending the university, a sample of students was
assessed on a battery of both knowledge (e.g., quantitative reasoning) and attitudinal
measures (e.g., PES) twice during their college career: once as incoming freshmen (Time
1), and again in the spring semester of their sophomore year (1.5 years after they started
college) if they had completed between 45 and 70 credit hours (Time 2). Most incoming
freshmen were assessed at Time 1. However, it is important to note that not all students
who were administered the PES at Time 1 also completed the measure at Time 2. Some
students, who completed the PES at Time 1, earned more than 70 credits by the end of
their third semester, and therefore were not required to complete the assessments at Time
2. Likewise, not all students who were administered the PES at Time 2 completed the
measure at Time 1. For example, students who transferred to the university and had
earned enough credit hours to complete the assessments at Time 2 would not have PES
scores at Time 1. The group of participants that is of interest for the current study is
comprised of students who completed the PES both at Time 1 and Time 2.
It is important to note that although these assessments are mandatory and highstakes to the university, they are of low-stakes to the students. That is, although the
university makes important decisions based on the assessment results, for students the
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results bare no serious personal consequences. Therefore, some participants may not
have been very motivated to put forth their best effort while completing the assessments,
which in turn may affect the reliability of scores, as well as the validity of inferences
made based on scores. Fortunately, the PES is a short measure, thus participants are not
likely to get fatigued. Moreover, as described below, extensive data screening was
conducted to identify and remove any participants who were likely not providing valid
responses to the PES.
Measure
The Psychological Entitlement Scale (PES; W. K. Campbell et al., 2004) was
used to measure participants‟ levels of psychological entitlement at Time 1 and Time 2
(see Appendix for PES items). The PES consists of 9 Likert items with response options
ranging from 1 (“strong disagreement”) to 7 (”strong agreement”). Item 5 (“I do not
necessarily deserve special treatment”) is negatively-phrased, and thus Item 5 was
reverse-scored prior to data analysis. Higher PES scores indicate a greater level of
psychological entitlement. Importantly, the reverse-scored Item 5 was used to identify
respondents who provided invalid scores (i.e., engaged in a response set), as is discussed
below.
Participants
Data from Time 1: Incoming college freshmen. At Time 1, responses were
gathered from 3749 incoming college freshmen. Only 35 participants (0.9%) had missing
data on one or more of the PES items. These 35 students were excluded from the sample,
resulting in 3714 freshmen with complete data from the first testing occasion. Further,
Mahalanobis distance values were examined to identify multivariate outliers. Six
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participants were deemed multivariate outliers due to their nonsensical response patterns
(e.g., 1, 7, 1, 7,…). Moreover, 29 participants provided what appeared to be response
sets (e.g., 7, 7, 7, 7, 1, 7, 7, 7, 7). Recall Item 5 is negatively-phrased and was reversescored; thus, these 29 participants appear to not have attended to the content of the items
and simply recorded the same response (e.g., “7”) for every item. Thus, an additional 35
participants were removed, leaving a sample of 3679 at Time 1.
Data from Time 2: Second-semester sophomores. At Time 2, responses to the
PES were gathered from 3346 participants. It is important to note that this sample of
3346 participants consisted only of students with 45-70 credits. Thus, not all students
who were tested at Time 1 were tested at Time 2; some students tested at Time 1 had less
than 45 credits or more than 70 credits and were not eligible to be tested at Time 2. In
addition, this Time 2 sample contains participants who were not tested at Time 1 (transfer
students).
Only 33 participants had missing data on some PES items (1.0%), and thus were
excluded from the sample, resulting in 3313 participants with complete data from the
second testing occasion. Further, Mahalanobis distance values were examined, and six
participants were identified as multivariate outliers with nonsensical response patterns
(e.g., 2, 7, 1, 7,…). Moreover, 31 participants were identified as providing a response set
(e.g., 2, 2, 2, 2, 6, 2, 2, 2, 2), thus resulting in a sample of 3276 at Time 2.
Matched data (Time 1 and Time 2). For the purposes of the analyses in the
current study, datasets from Time 1 and Time 2 were matched by participant ID, resulting
in a sample of 2195 participants with complete data from both Time 1 (incoming
freshman) and Time 2 (fourth semester college student). A summary of sample sizes

39
across testing occasions before the removal of outliers and response sets is presented in
Table 1. The noticeable decrease in the number of participants in the matched sample
compared to the individual samples at Time 1 (N = 3679) and Time 2 (N = 3276) is due
to the fact that some participants were not tested at either occasion for one of two
reasons. As mentioned above, some students who were tested at Time 1 were not tested
at Time 2 because they were not eligible to be tested; in fact only 65% of those tested at
Time 1 (or 2442 of the 3749 students tested at Time 1) were within the required range of
45-70 credit hours in order to be tested at Time 2. In addition, 12% of the students who
were tested at Time 2 (or 402 of the 3346 students tested at Time 2) had no data from
Time 1 because they were transfer students. Thus, these two groups of students explain
the decreased sample size of the matched sample compared to the full sample at Time 1
or Time 2 (see Table 1).
The matched sample consisted of 83.1% Caucasian students, 5.2% Asian students,
2.7% Hispanic students, 2.1% Black students, 0.6% Pacific Islander students, 0.2%
American Indian students, and 6.1% students who did not specify their ethnic
background. The sample consisted of 66.7% female students. At Time 1, the participants
had an average age of 18.43 years (SD = 0.39).
Data Analysis and Model Evaluation
The PES data from Time 1 and Time 2 were analyzed in three stages. First, an
examination and interpretation of descriptive statistics was conducted. Next,
measurement invariance was tested. Finally, given (at least partial) measurement
invariance, latent variable stability testing was conducted.
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When testing measurement invariance, model fit was assessed via a chi-square
(χ2) significance test of global fit, several indices of approximate fit, and residuals. The
χ2 significance test is an exact test of the model-data fit. That is, a significant χ2 would
indicate that elements of the reproduced covariance matrix are significantly different
from elements of the original covariance matrix. Researchers have noted that the χ2 test
is very sensitive to sample size, such that when sample size increases, so does the
likelihood of obtaining a significant χ2 (Hu & Bentler, 1998). Because of this, and more
importantly, because researchers are typically interested in measures of approximate fit
rather than measures of exact fit, the χ2 was supplemented by two types of approximate
fit indices: absolute and incremental.
The standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) is an absolute fit index,
which indicates the degree of global misfit between the observed and model-implied
relationships among the modeled variables. The SRMR is especially sensitive to
misspecified factor correlations. SRMR values range from 0 to 1, and smaller values are
indicative of better fit. Specifically, researchers have recommended a cutoff value of ≤
.08 as an indicator of adequate global model-data fit (Hu & Bentler, 1998; 1999).
The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is another absolute fit
index indicative of global model-data fit. The RMSEA is sensitive to misspecified factor
pattern coefficients (i.e., the relationships between the factor and the items). Values for
the RMSEA range from 0 to 1, and smaller values are indicative of better fit.
Specifically, values ≤ .06 have been recommended as indicators of good global modeldata fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
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The comparative fit index (CFI) is an incremental fit index, which compares the
fit of the hypothesized model to a null model, where the relationships among all observed
variables (items in the current study) are set to equal zero. That is, the CFI indicates the
degree of model-data fit improvement of the current model from a null model. Similar to
the RMSEA, the CFI is very sensitive to misspecified factor pattern coefficients (Hu &
Bentler, 1998). CFI values range from 0 to 1, with larger values indicative of better fit.
Hu and Bentler (1999) recommend using a cutoff of ≥ .95 as a criterion for good global
fit.
It is important to note that some researchers have challenged the appropriateness
of the aforementioned fit index cutoff values and have recommended using them as
guidelines rather than exact rules (Fan & Sivo, 2007; Marsh, Hau, & Grayson, 2005;
Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004; Sharma, Mukherjee, Kumar, & Dillon, 2005). In fact, Hu and
Bentler (1998) themselves advise that unlike the strict χ2 statistic, which offers a
dichotomous decision based on a significance test, fit indices can be used to “quantify the
degree of fit along a continuum” (p. 426). Moreover, Vandenberg and Lance (2000)
suggest using a range of cutoffs instead of strict cutoffs.
In addition to assessing global fit with the χ2 test and approximate fit indices,
local model-data fit was assessed by examining each correlation and mean residual.
Correlation residuals are simply the difference values between elements of the observed
correlation matrix and corresponding elements of the reproduced correlation matrix.
Correlation residuals greater than |.10| are indicative of specific item-pair relationships
not reproduced well by the model (Kline, 2011). Mean residuals, which are pertinent
when testing scalar invariance, are the difference values between the observed item
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means and the reproduced item means for each item at a given time point. Unlike the
correlation residuals, there is no specific cutoff value that could serve as a guideline in
establishing scalar measurement invariance. Rather, the mean residuals should be
interpreted in the context of the scale being used (e.g., residuals of |.50| on a 4-point scale
would be considered large).

Chapter IV
Results
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the 9 PES items are summarized in Table 2. The item
means and standard deviations were examined to determine how respondents scored on
average and the variability in scores around these means. Item means varied between 2.4
and 3.7 at Time 1, and between 2.5 and 3.6 at Time 2, indicating respondents tended to
slightly or moderately disagree with the entitlement statements. All standard deviations
were greater than 1.0, indicating there was sufficient variability associated with each item
(i.e., no floor or ceiling effects). In addition, frequency distributions indicated all
response options (i.e., 1 through 7) were utilized by respondents at both time points.
Univariate normality was assessed via comparison of skewness and kurtosis
values for the 9 PES items against suggested cutoffs of |2| and |7|, respectively (West,
Finch, & Curran, 1995). All 9 items displayed univariate normal distributions; univariate
skewness and kurtosis values at both time points were less than |1.0|. Multivariate
normality was assessed via Mardia‟s normalized multivariate kurtosis statistic. Although
there is no agreed-upon cutoff value, the Mardia‟s value is typically reported in
covariance structures analysis. Mardia‟s normalized multivariate kurtosis for the sample
at Time 1 was 35.55, and 43.30 at Time 2, suggesting multivariate non-normality (Finney
& DiStefano, 2006). Because of the possible effects of multivariate non-normality, the
Satorra-Bentler (S-B) scaling method (Satorra & Bentler, 1994) was employed in
conjunction with maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. The S-B scaling adjusts the ML
χ2, ML standard errors, and ML fit indices for multivariate kurtosis, thus producing less
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biased estimates of model fit and standard errors of the estimated parameters (Finney &
DiStefano, 2006). Given the univariate normality of the data, CFAs were also conducted
using the ML estimator without the S-B adjustment, in order to determine whether the
use of the S-B scaling method would produce substantively different results. Previous
studies have reported that when the data are fairly normally distributed univariately and
have at least five response options, bias due to multivariate non-normality is negligible
(Finney & DiStefano, 2006; West, Finch, & Curran, 1995). Indeed, the χ2 statistic,
standard errors, and fit indices did not differ substantially when the unadjusted ML
estimator and the S-B scaling method were employed. Therefore, only the (unadjusted)
ML estimation results are presented here.
Multicollinearity was assessed within time points by examining the correlation
matrix for highly related items (r > .80). Within each time point, the PES items were
moderately correlated at both time points, with the largest correlations being .59 at Time
1 and .61 at Time 2, indicating no extreme multicollinearity.
Recall that Item 5 is negatively-phrased, and as such it correlated less strongly
with the other items. Ignoring Item 5, the inter-item correlations were of approximately
the same magnitude (ranging from .36 to .59 for Time 1 and from .36 to .61 for Time 2),
suggesting that a unidimensional model might represent the data well, with a weak
relationship between Item 5 and the factor at both time points. This hypothesized model
was formally assessed when testing configural invariance.
Measurement Invariance
LMACS analysis was used to test configural, metric, and scalar invariance.
Researchers generally agree that when both rank-order and latent mean change are
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evaluated, configural, metric, and scalar invariance need to be established (Bontempo &
Hofer, 2006; Sass, 2011; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998; Thompson & Green, 2006,
Vandenberg & Lance, 2000; Widaman, Ferrer, & Conger, 2010). Several additional tests
of invariance can be performed (e.g., test of equivalent error variances, test of equal
factor variances); however, these tests are not necessary when the researcher‟s purpose is
to compare latent means (Byrne & Stewart, 2006; Schmitt & Kuljanin, 2008; Widaman
& Reise, 1997).
Indices used to assess measurement invariance. Testing for measurement
invariance involved a multi-step approach, with less constrained models being supported
before more constrained models were tested. Moreover, because the more constrained
models are nested within the less constrained models, differences in model fit could be
evaluated. Specifically, if the fit of a more constrained model was not statistically or
practically worse than the fit of a less constrained model, invariance at the level of the
more constrained model was established (Dimitrov, 2006; Steenkamp & Baumgartner,
1998). Both a non-significant chi-square difference (Δχ2) test and CFI difference ≤ .01
were used as criteria in evaluating measurement invariance models. Specifically, some
researchers contend that similar to the χ2 statistic, the Δχ2 is also an exact test of fit, and
therefore it should be supplemented with change in the values of approximate fit indices,
such as the CFI (Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998). Cheung and Rensvold (2002) have
suggested that the CFI is especially effective when examining the difference in fit across
nested models, and have recommended change in CFI (ΔCFI) ≤ .01 as an indicator of
invariance. Other researchers, however, have challenged this approach, noting that the
CFI lacks power and may not signal non-invariance when the Δχ2 does, and therefore
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only the Δχ2 test should be used (French & Finch, 2006). Still other researchers have
argued that a relative fit (e.g., CFI) approach is more appropriate for the measurement
part, whereas an exact fit (Δχ2) approach is more appropriate for the structural part (e.g.,
when estimating the latent mean difference) of invariance testing (Little, Card, Slegers, &
Ledford, 2007). Given that the Δχ2 test and the ΔCFI often provide conflicting results,
these two indices were supplemented by the correlation and mean residuals in order to
determine whether invariance had been established.
Scaling the factor. There are several methods of setting the metric of the
factor(s) being modeled and each method has different advantages.1 For a single group
CFA model, it is common practice to scale the factor by setting its variance to a value of
one. In this case, the researcher is not interested in estimating or interpreting the factor
variance, but rather the factor pattern coefficients. In testing measurement invariance
over time, however, this method may not be appropriate for several reasons. First, fixing
the factor variance to one at each time point assumes that factor variances are equal
across time, which is overly restrictive (Marsh, 1994). Related to this point, when testing
for metric invariance, one would be testing the invariance of factor variances in addition
to the invariance of factor pattern coefficients (just the latter would be sufficient to
establish metric invariance), thus making the model too restrictive. Second, it may of
interest to the researcher to estimate the factor variances and interpret them in order to
gauge the variability of latent scores across time.
Given these considerations, the factors in each model were scaled by fixing the
factor pattern coefficient between the factor and Item 9 to a value of one (i.e., Item 9
served as the referent indicator; see Little et al., 2007). All other parameters were either
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freely estimated or constrained to a value appropriate for the level of invariance being
tested. This constraint on Item 9 to set the metric of the factor assumes that Item 9 is
invariant across time. To test the invariance of Item 9, each of the models were reestimated using Item 1 as the referent indicator (see Rensvold & Cheung, 2001). Given
that all of these re-estimated models resulted in the same fit as their counterparts when
Item 9 was used as the referent item, the invariance of Item 9 was established.
Configural invariance. Configural invariance was tested in two steps. First, the
covariance matrices from each time point were analyzed separately to test if the onefactor model fit the data at Time 1 and Time 2 independently. CFAs were conducted
using LISREL 8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2006).
The one-factor model fit the data well globally at both time points: 2 (27, N =
2195) = 434.45, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .04 at Time 1; 2 (27, N = 2195) =
541.19, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .04 at Time 2. Moreover, there were no
localized areas of misfit at either time point; all correlation residuals were less than |.10|,
with the largest being .08 at both time points, and 72% of the correlation residuals falling
at or below |.05| at Time 1 and 67% at Time 2. Given adequate model-data fit, factor
pattern coefficients could be interpreted.
Large standardized pattern coefficients suggest that items adequately represented
the construct (Thompson, 1997). At both Time 1 and Time 2, all 9 PES items were
associated with standardized pattern coefficients at or above .65 and .67, respectively,
indicating that the factor explained at least 42% (Time 1) and 45% (Time 2) of each
item‟s variance, except for Item 5 (8% and 14%, respectively; see Table 3). The weak
relationship between the factor and Item 5 was not unexpected given the weak
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correlations between Item 5 and the remaining items on the PES. Importantly, four of the
PES items at Time 1 and six at Time 2 had standardized pattern coefficients at or above
.7 (i.e., the factor explained at least 50% of its items‟ variance). Except for Item 5, the
items appeared to represent the factor well. Moreover, internal consistency, calculated
using the CFA‟s unstandardized parameters (McDonald, 1999; Reuterberg & Gustafsson,
1992), was adequate (ω = .88 at Time 1 and .89 at Time 2).
The second step of testing for configural invariance involved fitting a
unidimensional factor structure to the data from Time 1 and Time 2 simultaneously by
analyzing the large covariance matrix that represents both time points (i.e., analyze the
relationships represented in Table 2). This model, pictured in Figure 2, includes error
covariances between corresponding items from Time 1 and Time 2 (autocorrelations) to
account for the systematic error variance shared by corresponding pairs of items across
testing occasions. As expected, given the well-fitting independent CFA models, this
combined model fit the data from Time 1 and Time 2 well globally (see Table 4), with no
localized areas of misfit (all correlation residuals were < |.10|, with 85% of the residuals
being < |.05|). Both the unstandardized and standardized pattern coefficients remained
essentially the same as those presented in Table 3. Given these results, configural
invariance was established, and this model was used as the baseline model for testing
metric invariance.
Metric invariance. In the metric invariance model, corresponding
unstandardized factor pattern coefficients at Time 1 and Time 2 were constrained to be
equal, whereas the remaining parameters were freely estimated. The metric invariance
model fit the data well, and the global fit was not significantly worse than that of the
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baseline (configural invariance) model (see Table 4). Moreover, all correlation residuals
were < |.10| (83% were < |.05|), indicating no localized areas of misfit. With respect to
the PES, establishing metric invariance indicated that each of the nine items were equally
salient to the factor across time. That is, the construct was equally well represented by
the PES items at Time 1 and Time 2. Given metric invariance was established, this
model served as the baseline model for testing scalar invariance.
Scalar invariance. Several scalar invariance models were tested (see Table 4).
In each model, the intercept for Item 9 was fixed to zero at Time 1 and Time 2, in order
to estimate the factor means. In the first (fully constrained) scalar invariance model, the
intercepts of all corresponding items were constrained to be equal across time. This
scalar model fit the data well globally; however, the Δχ2 test comparing the fit of this
model to the fit of the metric invariance model was significant, signaling partial scalar
non-invariance.
Examination of the residuals for the means indicated somewhat large residuals for
the means of Items 4, 2, and 3: |.11|, |.10|, and |.05|, respectively, on a 7-point scale. It is
important to note that due to the equality constraints placed on the item intercepts, when
an item mean is not fully driven by the latent mean across time, there will be a positive
residual associated with that item mean at one point, and a negative residual for the item
mean at the other time point. For example, the value of -.11 indicated that the mean for
Item 4 was overestimated by the model by about a tenth of a point at Time 1 and
accordingly underestimated by the same amount at Time 2 (i.e., a positive residual of
.11). That is, the model implied means for Item 4 reflect solely the latent mean
difference across time; thus, a value of -.11 at Time 1 and a value of .11 at Time 2
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indicates the estimated latent mean difference underestimated the observed mean
difference across time for Item 4. Interestingly, the opposite was true for Item 2 (i.e., the
item mean was underestimated by the model at Time 1 and overestimated at Time 2,
respectively), indicating that the means for Items 2 and 4 were “biased” in opposite
directions from Time 1 to Time 2. Again, these mean residuals reflect the restrictive
equality constraints that were imposed on the item intercepts. That is, when specifying
both metric and scalar invariance, the model-implied item means at Time 1 and Time 2
can only reflect the latent means at Time 1 and Time 2. In other words, something other
than the factor is influencing the responses to those three items, leading to systematic
over- (Item 4) and underestimation (Items 2 and 3) of the item means at Time 1.
The mean residuals associated with these three items were not large given the 7point scale. In order to assess the potential effect of scalar non-invariance (or uniform
differential item functioning, DIF) for Items 2, 3, and 4, three additional scalar invariance
models were estimated, the fit of which was compared back to the baseline (metric
invariance) model. These results are presented in Table 4. The equal-intercept constraint
for the three potentially non-invariant items was released in each model one at a time
(i.e., first for Item 4, then for Item 2, and finally for Item 3). The tests were conducted in
this particular order based on the absolute size of the residuals associated with these items
(largest to smallest). The Δχ2 tests between the baseline (metric invariance) model and
the first two models were significant, indicating that even when the intercepts associated
with Items 4 and 2 were freely estimated across time, these two models still fit
significantly worse than the baseline metric invariance model. That is, some additional
items, beyond those already freely estimated, appeared scalar non-invariant. Specifically,
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each of these two models had one mean residual greater than |.05| indicating the intercept
for that item should not be constrained to be equal across time, in order to obtain accurate
mean estimates. For the last scalar invariance model (freely estimated intercepts for
Items 4, 2, and 3) however, the Δχ2 test was not significant, indicating this partial scalar
invariance model fit the data no worse than the baseline metric invariance model.
Moreover, no mean residual was greater than |.03| (a trivial difference, given the 7-point
scale), indicating this partial scalar invariance model reproduced the means most
accurately compared to the other scalar invariance models that were tested. Given these
results, this third partial scalar invariance model was deemed to best represent the data
from Time 1 and Time 2, with Items 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 demonstrating full measurement
invariance, and Items 2, 3, and 4 having configural and metric, but no scalar invariance.
However, this conclusion may be conservative, as the mean residuals were not overly
large for any item. Thus, to more fully evaluate the impact of the scalar non-invariant
items and assess its practical significance, latent mean difference tests were computed
with and without placing equality constraints on the intercepts associated with Items 2, 3,
and 4.
Latent Variable Stability
Given partial scalar invariance, a test of the latent mean difference was conducted
both with and without placing equality constraints on the scalar non-invariant items (see
Table 5). It is important to note that when the intercepts for some items are freely
estimated across time, those items do not contribute to the latent mean at either time
point. Regardless of whether the intercepts for the non-invariant items were constrained
to be equal or freely estimated across time, the latent mean difference was not significant,
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and the effect size was small (.012 and .041, respectively). The high similarity in latent
mean difference results based on all PES items (i.e., the intercepts for all corresponding
items were constrained to be equal across time) vs. only scalar invariant items (i.e., the
intercepts of scalar non-invariant items were freely estimated across time) was most
likely due to items having opposite patterns of uniform DIF. That is, the mean for Item 4
was overestimated at Time 1, whereas the means for Items 2 and 3 were underestimated
at Time 1. The opposite pattern occurred for Time 2. Thus, the latent mean difference
was not affected by the presence of this DIF in the fully scalar invariant model.
Practically the same results were obtained by computing a mean difference at the
observed level. The similarity of results at the latent and the observed level was due to
the high internal consistency of the observed PES scores at Time 1 and Time 2 (ω = .88
at Time 1 and .89 at Time 2).
Given the equivalence of factor structures and unstandardized pattern coefficients
(i.e., full configural and metric invariance), latent rank-order consistency across time
could be interpreted. The correlation coefficient between the psychological entitlement
factors at Time 1 and Time 2 was .61, p < .05 (factor variances at Time 1 and Time 2
were 1.16 and 1.32, respectively), indicating that the rank-order of respondents did
change to some degree. Although attenuated due to measurement error, the correlation of
observed scores at Time 1 and Time 2 was practically of the same value (r = .58, p < .05).
Again, the highly similar latent and observed score correlations are due to the high
internal consistency of the PES scores at both time points.
Given that rank-order consistency was only moderate, it appears that some
individuals increased on entitlement, whereas others decreased across time, leading to
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minimal, practically insignificant mean-level change over 1.5 years. Moreover, this
differential change was demonstrated by plotting the change trajectories of a random
sample of 5% of the participants (see Figure 4). The graph clearly shows that some
participants increased on entitlement from Time 1 to Time 2, others decreased across
time, and still others remained the same over time

Chapter V
Discussion
The purpose of the current study was two-fold. First, a review and comparison of
commonly used methods of assessing construct stability over two time points and a
modern latent variable approach (LMACS analysis) was provided. Second, the
application of LMACS analysis to assess stability claims about psychological entitlement
was demonstrated. Below is an in-depth discussion of the importance of assessing
longitudinal measurement invariance and the effects of partial non-invariance (i.e., items
displaying DIF), followed by the implications of the current study for the psychological
entitlement domain, and ending with some highlights of the advantages of using a unified
LMACS analysis approach to assessing invariance and construct stability over two time
points.
Establishing Measurement Invariance for the PES and Assessing the Effects of
Partial Non-Invariance
The current study demonstrated how to empirically test the assumption of
measurement invariance in longitudinal research. In order to do so, several models with
various levels of equality constraints were specified and fit to the PES data at Time 1 and
Time 2. First, a hypothesized one-factor model was fit to the data at each time point
independently and then with the data combined (configural invariance) to establish a
comparable factor structure across time. Both the independent one-factor models and the
combined data (correlated single-factor) model fit the PES data well, meaning that
participants defined the construct represented by the PES items similarly across time. If
this were not the case, none of the subsequent invariance testing, nor the latent stability
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tests, would have been meaningful because one would be comparing scores representing
conceptually different things. Fortunately, the PES demonstrated stable factor structure
across time; thus, the stability of measurement parameters could be assessed.
Subsequent invariance testing involved constraining the magnitude of factor
pattern coefficients (metric invariance) and intercepts (scalar invariance) of
corresponding items to be equal across time. The model with constrained factor pattern
coefficients resulted in adequate fit, indicating that corresponding PES items were
equally representative of the factor across time. That is, each item was as salient to the
factor at Time 1 as it was at Time 2. However, if this metric model did not fit the data
well, one would be observing non-uniform DIF (revealed by large correlation residuals
for metric non-invariant items across time). In a longitudinal design, non-uniform DIF
occurs when an item‟s observed score differs from one testing occasion to the next,
whereas the latent score remains the same across time. That is, the item could be highly
related to the factor at Time 1, but the relationship with the factor becomes weaker at
Time 2, or vice versa; thus biasing the total score at either time point. When non-uniform
DIF is present, one should no longer interpret the total scores from Time 1 and Time 2
because they are no longer comparable and could lead the researcher to erroneous
conclusions. Fortunately, the model with equality constraints on the factor pattern
coefficients of corresponding PES items fit the data just as well as the unconstrained
configural invariance model, thus establishing full metric invariance for the PES and
allowing subsequent invariance and rank-order stability testing.
The final set of parameters for which invariance needed to be established before
being able to analyze full construct stability (rank-order and mean-level stability)
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involved testing a model with equality constraints on the intercepts of corresponding
items across time. Unfortunately, this model resulted in a significantly worse fit than the
metric invariance model described above, and the relatively small mean residuals for
three items (Items 2, 3, and 4) indicated that these items may be exhibiting uniform DIF.
That is, the items were equally representative of the factor across time (they were metric
invariant), but their intercepts (item means when the factor equals zero) were
systematically biased from one time point to the next. Specifically, the mean for Item 4
was overestimated at Time 1, whereas the means for Items 2 and 3 were underestimated.
Recall that DIF occurs when extraneous variables, other than the construct of interest
(psychological entitlement), are affecting the responses to non-invariant items. Both nonuniform and uniform DIF affect the responses but do so differently (i.e., when the DIF is
non-uniform vs. when it is uniform). With non-uniform DIF, the extraneous variables
affect the relationship between the metric non-invariant item and the factor such that this
relationship is stronger at one time point and weaker at another time point, thus resulting
in different observed scores for the item with the same latent score across time. With
uniform DIF, the extraneous variables affect responses to the item such that that the
extraneous variables systematically “bump” the intercept of a scalar non-invariant item at
a given time point when the intercept (the item mean when the factor is zero) actually
remains the same across time. Given that only uniform DIF was present for three of the
PES items, below I discuss several potential variables that may be responsible for the
uniform DIF displayed by those three item (Items 2, 3, and 4).
The first thing to notice regarding the three scalar non-invariant items is their
pattern of change from Time 1 to Time 2 (see Table 2). Unlike the means of the rest of
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the PES items, which either increase or remain roughly the same from Time 1 to Time 2,
the means for two of the scalar non-invariant items (Items 2 and 3) decrease over time.
Clearly, Items 2 and 3 show a different pattern of change over time compared to the rest
of the PES items; thus, Items 2 and 3 do not reflect the small positive increase of PES
scores across time (i.e., the means of Items 2 and 3 decrease over time). This differential
pattern of change could well be the key to uncovering the aforementioned possible
extraneous variables affecting the responses for the three items displaying uniform DIF.
By far the most plausible explanation for the systematic upward or downward bias
in Items 2, 3, and 4 could be the wording of the items, coupled with the effect of
maturation after 1.5 years of college. That is, Item 2 (“Great things should come to me”)
and Item 3 (“If I were on the Titanic, I would deserve to be on the first lifeboat!”) appear
to be more extreme in nature and language than the rest of the items. Thus, Items 2 and 3
may have been endorsed more at Time 1 than the model predicted and less at Time 2 than
the model predicted because of the expectations college freshmen typically have at the
very beginning of their college career vs. later in their college career. However, this
attitudinal change only affected the responses to the two most extreme items (Items 2 and
3). That is, 1.5 years later students may not feel as “special” as they did when they were
freshmen, and thus endorsed these two more extreme items less strongly at Time 2 vs.
Time 1 relative to the endorsement of the other less extreme items at Time 2 vs. Time 1
(which actually increased or remained approximately the same across time). Thus,
because of the extremeness of these two items and the perceived feeling of being special
typical for students at the beginning of college, responses to Items 2 and 3 were

58
systematically biased across time (i.e., underestimated at Time 1 and overestimated at
Time 2).
A similar logic could be applied to the uniform DIF of Item 4 (“I demand the best
because I am worth it”). Unlike the rest of the PES items, Item 4 contains an explanatory
clause as to why the respondent should endorse the item. That is, the respondent must
possess some sort of “worthiness” in order to “demand the best”. Thus, Item 4 may be
affected by the extraneous variable of deservingness. When students completed the
measure as incoming freshmen, they may have not perceived themselves as worthy of
demanding the best, and thus did not endorse Item 4 very strongly. However, after 1.5
years of college, students likely experienced some hard work and/or struggle, and
therefore agreed with Item 4 more strongly than would be expected based solely on their
level of the latent construct psychological entitlement (an increase in the extraneous
variable deservingness is causing this unexpected increase in the item mean across time).
It is important to note that wording of the items combined with maturation of the
students is one of many possibilities why Items 2, 3, and 4 are exhibiting uniform DIF.
The fact that the bias among these items is bidirectional (i.e., positive for Item 4, but
negative for Items 2 and 3 at Time 1) is interesting in and of itself, and so is its effect on
the mean difference testing. Two things are important to note with respect to the
bidirectional uniform DIF exhibited by Items 2, 3, and 4 and its effect on the mean
difference analysis. Recall that the test of latent mean difference was conducted in the
full scalar invariance model (where all 9 items contributed to the factor mean) and also in
a partial scalar invariance model (where only the six scalar invariant items contributed to
the factor mean). First, a greater latent difference between Time 1 and Time 2 factor
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scores was found when only the scalar invariant items contributed to the mean. The
reason for this greater effect is that, on average, latent scores tended to increase from
Time 1 to Time 2, whereas the means for two of the non-invariant items (Items 2 and 3)
decreased. Because these two items would have contributed to the latent mean difference
in the opposite direction of many of the other items, the latent mean difference when
these non-invariant items did not contribute to the estimation of this difference was
greater than if they contributed to the estimation of the latent mean difference. The same
effect of the bidirectional change in Items 2, 3, and 4 was present when observed means
were analyzed. In fact, the combined decrease in the observed means of Items 2 and 3
from Time 1 to Time 2 equaled exactly the increase in the observed mean of Item 4
across time. This bidirectional change completely masked the effect of the scalar noninvariant Items 2, 3, and 4, resulting in nearly the same observed mean difference (.02 vs.
03) regardless of whether these items contributed to the total mean scores for Time 1 and
Time 2.
Fortunately, the uniform DIF discussed above was present only in three of the
PES items, and the mean residuals were not very large considering the PES response
scale. If uniform DIF were present in more items and the mean residuals were large,
neither the latent, nor the observed mean differences would have been meaningful. On
the one hand, when computing the latent mean difference test, only scalar invariant items
contribute to the mean. This may appear as a protection against the bias of scalar noninvariant items on the factor mean, but if many of the items on a given measure are scalar
non-invariant, the factor mean may no longer represent the construct well enough for any
substantive conclusions to be made. On the other hand, when observed scores are
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analyzed, the effects of large uniform DIF could seriously distort the results, and
potentially lead the researcher to a wrong conclusion. For example, an increase in
observed scores from Time 1 to Time 2 could be attributed to the latent construct under
investigation when the effect could be due simply to uniform DIF of a large number of
items in the same direction. In addition, it is important to note that uniform DIF can only
be detected when some, not all, items display uniform DIF. One would be unable to
distinguish true change on the construct (alpha change) from the effects of an extraneous
variable, if all items were equally affected by this extraneous variable.
Implications for the PES and the Psychological Entitlement Domain
The current study has several important implications for the domain of
psychological entitlement and the use of the PES to measure psychological entitlement
over time. First, I empirically tested whether a widely used measure of psychological
entitlement (PES; W. K. Campbell et al., 2004) displayed longitudinal measurement
invariance. Assessing the invariance of the PES was important because often it is
assumed that respondents conceptualize the construct the same way across time and that
the measure functions the same way across time, when neither may be true. Given that
no prior research has studied the PES in terms of measurement invariance, the current
study provided further construct validity evidence for the PES by establishing full
configural, metric, and partial scalar invariance for the PES with practically insignificant
bias of the three scalar non-invariance items over 1.5 years. Thus, the PES can be used as
a reliable measure of psychological entitlement in longitudinal research with college
student populations, in that the validity of inferences regarding levels of entitlement
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across time based on scores collected with the PES on such a sample has been
empirically supported.
After establishing measurement invariance for the PES, the stability of
psychological entitlement was assessed by examination of both rank-order and meanlevel consistency over two time points. It is essential to note that this is the first study to
assess the stability of psychological entitlement over a long period of time (1.5 years). In
this regard, the study provides empirical support to previous anecdotal evidence that
found, on average, entitlement to be relatively stable over time (e.g., W. K. Campbell et
al., 2004). Importantly, this study lends evidence that this is the case not only for short
periods of time (e.g., one to two months) but also for longer periods of time (1.5 years).
However, as mentioned previously, a construct‟s stability cannot be accurately and
completely determined by examining only mean-level change or rank-order consistency.
Both indicators need to be considered in assessing the presence of change. This necessity
was clearly illustrated in the case of psychological entitlement, in that no change was
found on average, but individual change was present across time (as indicated by a
moderate rank-order consistency coefficient). Thus, only when both mean-level change
and rank-order consistency are examined does one fully understand the type of change
taking place and the extent to which the construct under study remains stable over time.
Put simply, when assessing the change in psychological entitlement for college students,
it appeared that psychological entitlement was stable over time based on the lack of
change on average. Examination of individual change, however, through the moderate
rank-order consistency and especially by plotting the change trajectories for a sample of
participants over time revealed the differential change in psychological entitlement taking
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place among students. Some students increased, others decreased, and still others
retained approximately the same levels of psychological entitlement over 1.5 years. This
is a very important finding because it challenges the claims in the literature stating that
psychological entitlement is stable over time, which categorizes the construct as a trait.
The results discussed above, however, clearly indicate that while psychological
entitlement may be stable on average, individuals change differentially on the construct
over time.
Related to this point, the current study opens a whole new arena for future
research on the stability of entitlement. If this finding is replicated, it would be
interesting to examine possible explanations as to how and why levels of psychological
entitlement change for some people but not for others. That is, what predictors could be
added to the model to explain why some students increase in psychological entitlement,
whereas others decrease, or remain fairly consistent? Moreover, why is it that over short
periods of time (e.g., one and two months) test-retest consistency is high (.72 and .70; W.
K. Campbell et al., 2004), but over long periods of time (1.5 years in the current study) it
is only moderate (.61). Is psychological entitlement one of the individual differences that
Fraley and Roberts (2005) and Veenhoven (1994) described as highly consistent over
short periods of time but less stable over longer periods of time? Obviously, answering
this question would shed light on possible interventions to decrease entitlement.
LMACS Analysis as a Unified Approach to Assessing Construct Stability
Given the importance of empirically testing the assumption of measurement
invariance in longitudinal research and the examination of both average and individual
change over time, the above didactic demonstration hopefully highlights the advantages
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of LMACS analysis over more traditional approaches to assessing construct stability over
two time points. First, unlike traditional statistical techniques, such as t-test or ANOVA,
which assume measurement invariance, I demonstrated how LMACS analysis allows the
researcher to empirically test this assumption through the multi-step process of invariance
testing. As mentioned previously, establishing measurement invariance for a given
instrument ensures that respondents conceptualize consistently the construct of interest
across testing occasions and also that the instrument measures the construct the same way
across time. By testing for measurement invariance, the researcher collects evidence for
the presence of these highly desired properties of scores in longitudinal research.
Second, once measurement invariance is established, I demonstrated how
LMACS analysis allows for the tests of stability to be conducted at the latent level.
Conducting these tests at the latent level has several advantages, the most important being
that a latent modeling approach may be a more appropriate method of modeling
unobservable constructs. This advantage is most apparent when analyzing items that are
complex in nature (i.e., items representing multiple constructs). If items are truly
multidimensional, analyzing the data at the latent level allows the researcher to
“disentangle” the variance due to the construct of interest from the variance due to other
constructs that may or may not be of interest. Analyzing multidimensional items using
observed variable techniques would prevent the researcher from better understanding the
structure of the scores and could lead to erroneous conclusions regarding the construct(s)
of interest. Alternatively, if the items are truly unidimensional, the data could easily be
analyzed using observed variable techniques. However, even with simple structure,
analyzing the data at the latent level is advantageous. A latent analytical approach
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accounts for both measurement error in the indicators and any systematic error variance
in corresponding items across time, thus yielding more accurate parameter estimates and
a more powerful analysis overall.
Finally, LMACS analysis allows all of the analyses described above to be
conducted within a single analytical framework. Once configural and metric invariance
have been established, the researcher can assess rank-order consistency by examination
of the factor correlation across time, which is readily available in the output. Similarly,
once scalar invariance is established, one can compute and interpret the latent mean
difference test using the latent means, variances and covariances across time from the
output. As such, LMACS analysis represents a convenient unified framework for
conducting sound construct stability research with numerous advantages over traditional
statistical techniques.
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Footnotes
1

Regardless which method is used to scale the factor, conclusions regarding

measurement invariance remain the same. Different scaling methods offer different
interpretation of parameter estimates, but model fit and latent mean difference effect size
are the same across scaling methods (see Little et al., 2007).
2

The formula used to compute the latent mean difference effect size is:
Latent d 

3

(κ 2j  κ1j )
ψ pooled

, where

ψ pooled 

n1ψ1jj  n 2 ψ

n1  n 2 

2jj

 2(1  r12 )

The formula used to compute the observed mean difference effect size is:
Observed d 

(μ 2j  μ1j )
SD pooled

(n1 - 1)(s1 )  (n 2 - 1)(s 2 )
(n1  n 2  2) 2(1  r12 )
2

, where SD pooled 

2
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Appendix
Please respond to the following items using the number that best reflects your own
beliefs. Please use the following 7-point scale:

1 = strong disagreement.
2 = moderate disagreement.
3 = slight disagreement.
4 = neither agreement nor disagreement.
5 = slight agreement.
6 = moderate agreement.
7 = strong agreement.

1. I honestly feel I‟m just more deserving than others.
2. Great things should come to me.
3. If I were on the Titanic, I would deserve to be on the first lifeboat!
4. I demand the best because I‟m worth it.
5. I do not necessarily deserve special treatment.
6. I deserve more things in my life.
7. People like me deserve an extra break now and then.
8. Things should go my way.
9. I feel entitled to more of everything.
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Table 1
Sample Size across Testing Occasions
Number of students

Missing Data

administered the

Complete

Outliers

Data

PES
Time 1

3749

35

3714

29

Time 2

3346

33

3313

31

NA

2267

2195

Match

NA

Note. Of the 3749 students tested at Time 1, only 2442 students (65%) were eligible to be
tested at Time 2. In addition, 402 (12%) of the 3346 students tested at Time 2 were not
tested at Time 1 because they were transfer students. Thus, the 2267 reflects only those
students who completed between 45 and 70 credit hours by the second semester of their
sophomore year.

Table 2
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics for the PES Items at Time 1 and Time 2
Item

1T1

2 T1

3 T1

4 T1

5 T1

6 T1

7 T1

8 T1

9 T1

1T2

2 T2

3 T2

4 T2

5 T2

6 T2

7 T2

8 T2

9 T2

1T1

--

2T1

.526

--

3T1

.497

.493 --

4T1

.435

.485 .525

--

5T1

.228

.181 .261

.201

--

6T1

.482

.477 .475

.497

.171

--

7T1

.442

.417 .409

.364

.130

.550

--

8T1

.451

.515 .458

.467

.164

.523

.563

--

9T1

.566

.470 .570

.481

.277

.574

.533

.586

--

1T2

.468

.344 .340

.300

.182

.345

.310

.336

.394

--

2T2

.313

.479 .334

.340

.152

.357

.288

.373

.352

.584

--

3T2

.295

.285 .451

.312

.172

.316

.249

.299

.352

.537

.519

--

4T2

.259

.291 .310

.479

.130

.322

.239

.304

.289

.467

.532

.540

--

5T2

.183

.137 .189

.133

.228

.160

.100

.135

.192

.297

.245

.312

.250

--

6T2

.300

.328 .306

.294

.147

.439

.317

.339

.342

.502

.547

.491

.492

.226

--

7T2

.290

.263 .276

.243

.152

.307

.416

.320

.312

.462

.432

.456

.401

.213

.585

--

8T2

.288

.342 .283

.315

.126

.328

.301

.453

.348

.482

.574

.487

.518

.244

.581

.583

--

9T2

.348

.292 .337

.269

.189

.345

.291

.348

.421

.611

.503

.578

.491

.355

.606

.549

.593

--

Mean

2.70

3.72 2.57

3.19

2.73

3.19

3.21

3.23

2.37

2.76

3.56

2.50

3.42

2.71

3.18

3.26

3.33

2.39

SD

1.50

1.68 1.50

1.69

1.37

1.48

1.57

1.56

1.38

1.59

1.71

1.55

1.76

1.45

1.54

1.63

1.55

1.44

Skewness

0.45

-0.11 0.73

0.29

0.85

0.05

0.15

0.11

0.71

0.48

0.04

0.83

0.19

0.85

0.20

0.20

0.06

0.81

Kurtosis

-0.82

-0.90 -0.11

-0.91

0.52

-0.80

-0.85

-0.80

-0.36

-0.81

-0.093 -0.06

-0.95

0.36

-0.69

-0.83

-0.69

-0.02

Note. Responses range from 1 (strong disagreement) to 7 (strong agreement). Item 5 (rs in bold) was reverse coded prior to these statistics being computed.
T1 = Time 1. T2 = Time 2. N = 2195.
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Table 3
Unstandardized (Standardized) Factor Pattern Coefficients, Error Variances, and
Variance Explained for the 9 PES Items in the Independent One-factor CFA Models at
Time 1 and Time 2
Pattern Coefficients
Item

R2

Error Variance

Time 1

Time 2

Time 1

Time 2

Time 1

Time 2

1

0.96 (.69)

1.15 (.72)

1.01 (.52)

1.21 (.48)

.48

.52

2

1.05 (.68)

1.23 (.72)

1.08 (.54)

1.40 (.48)

.46

.52

3

0.97 (.70)

1.10 (.71)

0.96 (.51)

1.19 (.50)

.49

.50

4

1.02 (.65)

1.18 (.67)

1.04 (.57)

1.72 (.55)

.43

.45

5

0.37 (.29)

0.53 (.37)

0.47 (.92)

1.75 (.86)

.08

.14

6

0.99 (.73)

1.16 (.75)

1.02 (.47)

1.04 (.44)

.53

.56

7

0.97 (.67)

1.11 (.68)

1.98 (.56)

1.41 (.53)

.44

.47

8

1.04 (.72)

1.17 (.75)

1.03 (.47)

1.05 (.43)

.53

.57

9

1.00 (.79)

1.14 (.79)

1.00 (.38)

0.78 (.38)

.62

.62

Note. All unstandardized pattern coefficients were statistically significant (p <.05) except
Item 9 which was fixed to 1 and could not be tested for significance; standardized pattern
coefficients are in parentheses; standardized error variances (proportion of variance in the
indicator not explained by the factor) are in parentheses; R2 = proportion of variance in
the indicator accounted for by the factor.
N = 2195.

Table 4
Fit Statistics for the Models Testing Measurement Invariance across Time 1 and Time 2
ML2

df

p-value

Δχ2

Δdf

Δp-value

SRMR

CFI

RMSEA

Configural Invariance

1055.24

125

< 0.001

--

--

--

0.032

0.95

0.06

Metric Invariance

1067.67

133

< 0.001

12.43

8

0.133

0.033

0.95

0.06

Scalar Invariance

1172.71

141

< 0.001

105.04

8

< 0.001

0.033

0.95

0.06

Equal Factor Means

1173.85

142

< 0.001

1.14

1

0.286

0.033

0.95

0.06

Scalar Invariance—i4 free

1123.76

140

< 0.001

56.09

7

< 0.001

0.033

0.95

0.06

Scalar Invariance—i2, i4 free

1091.64

139

< 0.001

23.97

6

0.001

0.033

0.95

0.06

Scalar Invariance—i2, i3, i4 free

1078.15

138

< 0.001

10.48

5

0.063

0.033

0.95

0.06

Equal Factor Means—i2, i3, i4 free

1081.01

139

< 0.001

2.86

1

0.091

0.033

0.95

0.06

Model

Note. Δχ2 = chi-square difference; Δdf = degrees of freedom difference; Δp-value = probability value for the Δχ2 test; SRMR = standardized root mean square
residual; CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation. The Δχ2 tests were conducted to compare more constrained models to
less constrained models in order to establish invariance for a set of parameters: the metric invariance model was compared to the configural invariance model, all
scalar invariance models were compared to the metric invariance model; Δχ2 tests were also conducted to test the latent mean difference for significance by
comparing the fit of both of the equal factor means models to the fit of the scalar model directly above it.
N = 2195.
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Table 5
Mean Differences of Latent and Observed PES Scores Based on All vs. Only Scalar Invariant Items
Latent Estimates

All Items

Only Invariant Items

Latent mean difference

0.020

0.040

Latent mean difference effect size

0.012

0.041

Observed Estimates

All Items

Only Invariant Items

Time 1 observed mean

2.991

2.906

Time 2 observed mean

3.012

2.939

Observed mean difference

0.022

0.034

Observed mean difference effect size

0.021

0.032

Note. Invariant items are Items 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Observed means range from 1 to 7. None of the mean differences were significant
at p < .05. Latent mean difference effect size values indicate standard deviation units by which the latent mean at Time 2 is greater
than that at Time 1, taking into account the correlation of scores across time.2 Observed mean difference effect size values indicate
standard deviation units by which the observed mean at Time 2 is greater than that at Time 1, taking into account the correlation of
scores across time.3
N = 2195.
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Figure 1. Rank-order consistency vs. mean consistency. The four scenarios above illustrate the results when crossing rank-order
consistency (yes vs. no) with mean consistency (yes vs. no). Dashed lines represent individual change over time.
82

Figure 2. Configural invariance model with correlated factors at Time 1 and Time 2 and correlated error variances for pairs of items.
All parameters are freely estimated.
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Figure 3. Metric and scalar invariance model, assuming configural invariance. Corresponding factor pattern coefficients (λ) and
intercepts (τ) for items from Time 1 and Time 2 are constrained to be equal, thus the lack of time subscripts. Latent means (κT1 and κT2)
are estimated.
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Figure 4. Individual change trajectories for a random sample of 105 participants (5%) from Time 1 to Time 2. The graph shows
visually the differential change taking place at the individual level: some participants increase on entitlement, others decrease, and still
others remain the same across time.
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